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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM F. WEBB, Trustee of 
the WFPP TRUST, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
FREDERICK PAUL NINOW; 
STACI L. NINOW; R-WEST, INC., 
a Corporation; WESTONE BANK, 
UTAH, a Corporation; HOMER 
CUTRUBUS; NED F. PARSON; 
JIM HART; and COMMERCIAL 
FACTORS OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
LTD., a Limited Partnership, 
Defendants/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PARTIES 
The parties are William F. Webb, Trustee of the WFPP Trust, 
plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter "lessor") and WestOne Bank of 
Utah, defendant/appellee (hereinafter "bank"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Rule 3, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the district court rule correctly that the bank's 
perfected security interest is superior to lessor's lien, even 
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though the lessor's lien was properly preserved and was prior in 
time to the perfected security interest?1 
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a 
legal conclusion, this court should accord it no deference, and 
should apply a "correction of error" standard of review.2 
Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (Utah 1988); Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
1
 Under § 38-3-2, U.C.A., 1990. 
2
 Standards of Review. 
(a) Trial court's interpretation of statute presents question 
of law reviewed on appeal for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
(b) The appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions 
of law no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness. 
When the trial court makes findings of fact based on the parties' 
stipulated facts, the appellate court treats these findings as 
conclusions of law. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title 
Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). 
(c) When reviewing an appeal from a summary iudgment, the 
appellate court inquires whether there is any genuine issue as to 
any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The appellate 
court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment. Transamerica Cash 
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24 (Utah 
1990); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). 
2 
STATUTE 
Lessor's Liens. 
38-3-1. Lien for rent due. 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a lien 
for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee 
brought or kept upon the leased premises so long as the 
lessee shall occupy said premises and for 30 days 
thereafter. 
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien. 
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be preferred 
to all other liens or claims except claims for taxes and 
liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
perfected security interests, and claims of employees for 
wages which are preferred by law; provided, that when a 
lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, or shall make an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or when his 
property shall be put into the possession of a receiver, 
the lien herein provided for shall be limited to the rent 
for ninety days prior thereto. 
38-3-3. Attachment in aid of lien. 
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under a lease, 
or the lessee shall be about to remove his property from 
the leased premises, the lessor may have the personal 
property of the lessee which is upon the leased premises 
and subject to such lien attached without other ground 
for such attachment. 
38-3-4. Attachment—Affidavit and bond. 
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of 
attachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly sworn 
to setting forth the amount of rent due over and above 
all offsets and counterclaims and a brief description of 
the leased premises, and shall further state, under oath 
that such writ of attachment is not sued out for the 
purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the person 
applying for such writ of attachment shall execute and 
file a bond as in other cases of attachment. 
3 
38-3-5. When attachment will issue—Determination of 
priorities. 
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit, and bond it 
shall be the duty of the court wherein the same are filed 
to issue a writ of attachment to the proper officer, 
commanding him to seize the property of the defendant 
subject to such lien, or so much thereof as will satisfy 
the desmand, and to make a determination of the priorities 
of the claims, liens, and security interests in such 
property. 
38-3-6. Execution of writ of attachment. 
It shcill be the duty of the officer to whom the writ of 
attachment is directed to seize the property of such 
lessee subject to such lien, or as much thereof as shall 
be necessary to satisfy such debt and costs, and to keep 
the same until the determination of the action, unless 
the property is sooner released by bond or the attachment 
is discharged. 
38-3-7. Release of attachment—Bond. 
A bond for the release of the attached property may be 
given, and motion to discharge the attachment may be 
made, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in cases 
of attachment. 
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease 
for a term of years in which, as part of the considera-
tion thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a 
building or improvements upon the leased premises. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case 
This appeal concerns the priority of claims to security 
4 
interests in equipment used in a business.3 
(b) Course of Proceedings 
Lessor filed its complaint and amended complaints and obtained 
a writ of attachment on the equipment. All defendants except the 
bank defaulted. The bank answered the complaints claiming its per-
fected security interest was superior to lessor's lien. The trial 
court disposed of the issue on cross motions for summary judgment 
ruling in favor of the bank. 
(c) Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court ruled that the bank's perfected security 
interest was superior to the lessor's lien, even though it was 
perfected after the lessor's lien attached to the collateral. 
FACTS4 
The stipulated facts are that lessor owns a commercial 
building located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On July 2, 1988, the 
lessee leased space from lessor in which to conduct a business.5 
The lease ran from July 1, 1988 to August 31, 1993. Prior to 
3
 The equipment is laminating equipment. The equipment was 
sold for $150,000 by stipulation of lessor and the bank with the 
liens to attach to the proceeds. 
4
 The facts are stipulated. (R353-355) and (Transcript pages 
1 and 5). 
5
 The lease was between plaintiff WFPP Trust, as lessor, and 
Frederick Paul Ninow, Staci L. Ninow and R-West Systems, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, as lessee. (R-9). 
5 
August 4, 1988, lessee moved equipment necessary for its business 
onto the leased premises. The lessee failed to make its monthly 
payment. On January 24, 1990 lessee abandoned the leased premises. 
On February 2, 1990, lessor filed its complaint and on February 22, 
1990 obtained a writ of attachment on lessee's equipment located on 
the leased premises. 
Lessee applied for a line of credit, and in December, 1988, 
obtained a $150,000 line of credit from the bank. The bank took a 
security interest in the equipment which was located on the leased 
premises. The bank filed its financing statement November 8, 1988. 
(R-249) The bank also obtained an assignment of a third party's 
security interest in the equipment with a financing statement filed 
August 4, 1988. (R-249) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Lessor's lien is superior to the bank's lien because it 
was perfected in accordance with §§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6 and 
attached to the collateral prior to the bank's perfected security 
interest. 
2. The historical development of landlord priority rights in 
common law distress actions and statutory lien rights indicate that 
lessor's liens are superior to competing security interests which 
are perfected after the inception of the lease and the collateral 
coming onto the leased premises. 
6 
3. The trial court did not consider the rule enunciated in 
Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983) which 
provides that when the lessor's lien is prior in time to the bank 
and the lessor then files a complaint against the lessee, requests 
a writ of attachment, and executes on the writ, the lessor's 
statutory lien is perfected and is superior to the bank's perfected 
security interest. 
4. The Utah statute6 may not apply because the lessee agreed 
to make improvements to the real property as part of the 
consideration for the lease.7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER 
SS 38-3-1 THROUGH 38-3-8, U.C.A., 1990 
AND UTAH CASE LAW 
Lessor contends that it has a statutory lien under § 38-3-1 
which is prior and superior to the bank's perfected security 
interest. Section 38-3-1 creates a limited lessor's lien which 
6
 §§ 38-3-1 through 38-3-6, U.C.A., 1990. 
7
 38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written lease 
for a term of years in which, as part of the 
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect 
a building or improvements upon the leased premises. 
7 
provides that lessors shall have a lien for rent due upon all non-
exempt property of lessee brought or kept upon the leased premises 
so long as the lessee shall occupy the premises and for 30 days 
thereafter. The lessor's lien terminates 30 days after the lessee 
quits the premises. The lessor's lien would have expired 30 days 
from January 24, 1990, i.e. February 24, 1990. Eason v. Wheelock, 
101 Utah 162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941). However, lessor preserved its 
statutory lien by complying with the terms established by U.C.A., 
1990, sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-6, including filing a complaint 
against the lessee, requesting and obtaining a writ of attachment 
and executing upon the writ within the 30 day period. Lessor 
perfected its statutory lien and is prior and superior to the 
bank's security interest. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldq., N.V., 663 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Lessor's Lien vs. Perfected Security Interest in a 
Nutshell8 
(a) Events 
The cases discuss the following events in lessor lien and 
perfected security interest transactions: 
The critical events for the lessor's lien are: 
(1) Lease creation. 
(2) Collateral coming onto the premises. 
8
 See Addendum Schedule "A" for a diagram of this material. 
8 
(3) Lessee's failure to pay rent. 
(4) Lessee ending occupancy of the premises. 
(5) Lessor's filing complaintf affidavit, and bond 
for writ of attachment within 30 days of event 
(4). 
(6) Execution of writ of attachment on collateral. 
The critical events for the competing security interest are: 
(1) Perfection of the security interest. 
(2) Loan advances. 
(b) Kappos9 
In Kappos, the events occurred in the following order: 
(1) Perfection of competing security interest 
(purchase money chattel mortgage in sheep). 
(2) Lease creation. 
(3) Collateral coming onto the premises. 
(4) Additional cash advances and renewal of chattel 
mortgage. 
(5) Lessee's failure to pay rent. 
(6) Lessee ending occupancy of the premises (selling 
the sheep). 
In Kappos the competing security interest (purchase money chattel 
mortgage) was perfected prior to the inception of the lease, and 
the court held for the purchase money chattel mortgage holder. 
(c) Citizens 
9
 Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936). 
9 
In Citizens, the events occurred in the following order: 
(1) Lease creation. 
(2) Collateral coming onto the premises (restaurant 
equipment). 
(3) Lessee's failure to pay rent. 
(4) Lessee ending occupancy of the premises. 
(5) Lessor's filing of complaint after 30 days. 
(6) Perfection of a competing security interest. 
The filing of the complaint was beyond 30 days from the lessee 
quitting the premises. Therefore, there was no valid lessor's 
lien, and the court held against the lessor. But the court stated 
that had the lessor filed its complaint and taken steps to obtain 
a writ of attachment on the collateral within 30 days after the 
lessee quit the premises, the lessor's lien would be prior to the 
competing perfected security interest. 
Thus, it is clear from the Citizens case that the perfected 
security interest does not always prevail over a lessor's lien. 
The clear implication is that if the lessor's lien attaches first 
and is properly preserved by the lessor filing its complaint for a 
writ of attachment on the collateral within 30 days after the 
lessee ends its occupancy, the lessor's lien is superior to the 
competing perfected security interest. 
(d) Webb 
In Webb, the events occurred in the following order: 
10 
(1) Lease inception. 
(2) Collateral onto the premises. 
(3) Perfection of competing security interest. 
(4) Lessee's failure to pay rent. 
(5) Lessee ending occupation of the premises. 
(6) Lessor's filing complaint, affidavit, and bond for 
writ of attachment on collateral within 30 day 
period. 
(7) Writ of attachment executed on collateral. 
Lessor should prevail because its lessor's lien attached at 
the inception of the lease when the collateral was brought onto the 
premises. Although the bank perfected a security interest prior to 
lessor's timely filing of complaint for writ of execution, the 
lessor's lien should prevail because it attached first and was 
subsequently preserved. 
POINT II 
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW 
DISTRESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE 
STATUTORY LANDLORD LIENS 
History of Landlord Liens10 
(a) Common Law 
A common law lien depends upon an independent and exclusive 
10
 The following is a summary taken from 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant, "Landlord's Lien," §§ 675-676, §§ 686-695 and 
§§ 717-726 (1970); not all sections are summarized. 
11 
possession of the property against which the lien is certain. It 
is based directly upon the idea of possession, apart from an actual 
seizure of property upon demised premises. When seizure is used, 
it is by levy of a distress for rent in arrears whereby the 
landlord acquires in effect a lien on the tenant's property for 
past due rent. A landlord by virtue of his position has no lien 
upon any property of his tenant as security for rent, in the 
absence of contract or statute. Thusf a lien in favor of the 
landlord, as distinguished from his right to distrain, arises only 
from a statute creating such a lien, or from the agreement of the 
tenant giving a lien. 
(b) Statutory Liens 
The statutes of many states give landlords a lien for rent 
upon the property of their tenants. The tenant's properties are 
simply charged with the lien of the landlord. Filing or recording 
the lease are not prerequisites to the right of a landlord to a 
statutory lien. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that Article 
9 thereof on secured transactions does not apply to a landlord's 
lien. Statutes giving the landlord a lien for rent on the property 
of his tenant are considered to be the outgrowth of the common law 
right of distress, and the principles controlling in cases of 
distress are often resorted to in determining the rights of the 
parties under such statutes. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442, 
12 
23 P. 780 (1890). The statutory lien of the landlord for rent 
attaches at the beginning of the tenancy, or when the chattels are 
brought upon the premises. Such a lien does not depend upon a 
levy, and exists independently of the institution of any proceeding 
for its enforcement. The remedy by levy, distress, or attachment, 
is simply to enforce a lien already existing. Gila Water Co. v 
Int'l Finance Corp., 13 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1926). The landlord's 
statutory lien must be enforced by judicial proceedings. Provision 
is made in some statutes for enforcing the lien by attachment. In 
some jurisdictions, the landlord is required to enforce his lien 
within a specified time; otherwise, it is lost. 
(c) Priorities 
A landlord's lien for the payment of rent is superior to any 
judgment or other lien acquired subsequently to the creation of the 
tenancy or the bringing of property onto the rented premises. 
Howard v. Calhoun, 155 Fla. 689, 21 So. 2d 361 (1945). 
Under statutes giving a lien upon all property of the lessee 
kept on the demised premises which shall be superior to any lien 
acquired subsequently to the bringing of such property on the 
premises, it has been held that the landlord's lien is inferior to 
that of another where the latter was acquired either prior to the 
bringing of the property in question upon the leased premises, or 
prior to the commencement of the tenancy under the lease, and 
13 
therefore thcit the landlord's lien did not attach absolutely to 
such property. Ruqe v. Webb Press Co>, 71 Fla. 536, 71 So. 627 
(1916). 
Under landlord's lien statutes confining the lien conferred to 
the goods of the tenant, it is uniformly held that the lien does 
not have priority over the rights of the conditional seller of 
property to the tenant, but is inferior thereto. Bebee v. Fouse, 
27 N.M. 194, 199 P. 364 (1921). The right of landlord and tenant, 
by lease contract, to create in favor of the landlord, a lien on 
goods bought by the tenant on conditional sale, superior to the 
rights of the conditional vendor, has been denied, at least as to 
goods purchased after the execution of the lease. But where the 
conditional seller is notified of the terms of the lease, the 
landlord's contractual lien has been held superior. Luce v. Stott 
Realty Co., 201 Mich. 587, 167 N.W. 869 (1918). 
Generally, a landlord's lien created by statute has been held 
to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by the tenant after he 
has rented or entered into possession of the premises. Beall v. 
White, 94 U.S. 382 (1877). In many cases, the superiority of the 
landlord's lien has been based upon the ground that the mortgagee 
was charged with notice of the lien. Weiqand v. Hyde, 109 Neb. 
678, 192 N.W. 198 (1923). Sometimes the superiority of the 
landlord's lien has been based upon the mortgagee having actual 
14 
knowledge of the existing tenancy. Crockett v. Bearce, 104 Mich. 
257, 62 N.W. 344 (1895). In some cases, the landlord's lien has 
been held to be superior to a chattel mortgage given by a tenant, 
without regard to the time when the latter was given, even though 
it was given before the beginning of the tenancy, but these 
generally are explained by the fact that the applicable lien 
statute by its terms or by necessary implication gave such 
priority. Where a chattel mortgage is given on the property of a 
person before he rents or leases premises from another, or before 
such property is brought on the premises, it is generally held that 
the mortgage is superior to the landlord's lien for rent. 
(d) Distress 
Distress for rent in arrears, whereby the landlord may seize 
personal property on the demised premises, is one of the oldest, as 
well as one of the most efficient, of the common law remedies for 
the collection of rent. Re West Side Paper Co., 162 F. 110 (3d 
Cir. 1908). The remedy had its origin in the feudal tenures and 
appears to have arisen when the common law process of gavelet and 
cessavit, by which the landlord could seize the land itself for 
rent in arrears and hold it until payment was made, fell in disuse. 
When these remedies fell into disuse, distresses appeared to have 
arisen whereby instead of seizing the land, the landlord seized all 
movables on the land and held them until he received payment. 
15 
Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631 (1912). The right to distrain 
arises from the moment the relation of landlord and tenant is 
established, and as administered at common law, the remedy is 
enforceable against any removable property found upon the demised 
premises, whether belonging to the tenant or to a stranger. 
POINT III 
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER THE CITIZENS 
BANK V. ELKS BLDG. CASE11 WHICH WAS NOT 
CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Oral Argument12 
(a) Bank's Arguments 
During the oral argument before the trial court, the bank's 
attorney recited the facts.13 
With regards to the law, bank's counsel recited § 38-3-2 to 
the court and argued that the landlord has a prior lien, except as 
to taxes, mechanic liens, perfected security interests, and 
11
 Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N.V., 663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983). 
12
 A copy of the trial court transcript is attached as an 
addendum. 
13
 The lease commenced July 2, 1988. The landlord's lien 
attaches at the start of the tenancy. The perfected security 
interest dates from August 4, 1988. The equipment was brought on 
the premises prior to August 4, 1988. The lease is in default, and 
the lessee owes the lessor $95,000. The bank loan is in default in 
the amount of $150,000. The collateral was sold by stipulation for 
$150,000 and the competing liens attached to the proceeds. 
16 
employee wage earnings. His argument is that the statute means 
what it says; perfected security interest has priority over a 
landlord lien no matter when it is perfected. 
He argues that there is no guidance in the cases. He referred 
to Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936), in which a 
purchase money security interest was held to be prior to the 
landlord's lien, but stated that the facts are distinguishable. He 
also stated that four other cases from other jurisdictions held the 
landlord's lien to be superior to a perfected security interest, 
but stated that none of the four jurisdictions have a statute like 
Utah's. Bank's counsel argued that where the priority is not set 
forth in a landlord lien statute, that the court then looks back to 
the common law, and the priority is given to the first attaching 
lien. If there is no statute, the landlord wins if his lien first 
attached. He further argued that if our Utah statute does not 
apply to all perfected security interests, but is limited to prior 
perfected security interests, then there is no need for the 
statute, i.e. we would be where we were under common law. 
Bank's counsel also argued that there was a good policy reason 
for the Utah Legislature changing from the common law priorities to 
making all perfected security interests superior to landlords 
liens. He argued that the Legislative policy reason was to allow 
lessees to borrow money and to allow banks to take security 
17 
interests without worrying about landlord liens.14 
The bank also argued that for the term "perfected security 
interest" not to have priority over a landlord lien unless it was 
created prior to the landlord's lien, the same principle, i.e. 
priority of creation, should be applied to all the other statutory 
exceptions, i.e. tax liens, employee wage claims, and mechanic 
liens.15 
(b) Lessor's Arguments 
Lessor's legal counsel in its presentation to the trial court 
agreed on the facts and the issue and stated that the Utah statute 
codifies the* common law. Lessor's counsel referred to Gray v. 
Kappos. which involved § 52-3-2 Revised Statutes, 1933, as amended, 
14
 The reason for the statute being changed by the Utah 
Legislature is contained in Senate Bill 191, which was to make 
corrections to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. In 1977, the 
phrase "mortgages for purchase money" was deleted, and the phrase 
"perfected security interest" was implemented in its place. The 
Uniform Commercial Code introduced the wording "security interest" 
to replace all other types of liens, such as chattel mortgages, 
hypothecations, pledges, conditional sales, and the like. Thus, 
the statutory change appears to have been made for these purposes 
rather than as a thoughtful analysis as to policy and priorities 
between competing interests such as banks and landlords. 
15
 It should be noted that banks commonly use landlord 
subordination agreements before making loans to known lessees. The 
bank could have avoided the risk of the landlord having a superior 
lien by using a landlord subordination agreement. Originally, the 
bank pleaded as an affirmative defense a landlord subordination 
agreement, but apparently there was no such subordination in this 
case. (R-116) 
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where the landlord lien was preferred to all other liens except 
claims for taxes, mechanic's liens, mortgages for purchase money, 
and employee claims for wages. The only statutory change in the 
present statute § 38-3-2 is that mortgages for purchase money has 
been eliminated and perfected security interest inserted in its 
place. 
The facts of the Kappos case are that the bank loaned Kappos 
$2,000 in October of 1928 to purchase sheep. The bank took a note 
and mortgage. In January, 1929, a grazing lease was entered into 
and the real property was used for grazing sheep for several years. 
The note went into default and was renewed with additional monies 
being advanced. The first mortgage was never released; it was a 
renewal, not a new transaction. The sheep were sold in 1932, and 
the landlord sought to satisfy its rent from the sale of the sheep. 
The bank's lien came into being before the inception of the lease 
and before the sheep were placed on the premises. The landlord 
claimed priority over the bank's advances made after the lease 
inception and after the sheep entering the premises. The bank's 
mortgage was not recorded but was valid against those with actual 
notice. The landlord acquired no rights greater than the lessee's. 
The landlord's lien attached to what the lessee had, and the 
lessee's rights were subject to the purchase money mortgage; 
therefore, the landlord's lien was also subject to a prior purchase 
19 
money mortgage. 
Mr. Orton, lessor's counsel, argued that the first event in 
this case was the lease commencing July 1, 1988; secondly, the 
equipment coming onto the premises; and thirdly the bank obtaining 
a perfected security interest. In the Kappos case, the first event 
was the creation of the chattel mortgage; the second event was the 
inception of the lease; the third event was the sheep coming on the 
premises; and the fourth event was the subsequent renewal note. 
Mr. Orton argued that the Legislature intended prior perfected 
security interests to prevail, but that if subsequent perfected 
security interests prevail over prior landlord liens, that the 
landlord could be deprived of his lien through "sham transactions." 
A lessee could borrow money, give a perfected security interest, 
and defeat a landlord lien. The trial court, Judge Stirba, asked 
Mr. Orton if there were not remedies for that type of conduct under 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Mr. Orton responded that fraud 
remedies are available, but that the rule from the Kappos case is 
that the first in time prevails. If the lease is first in time, 
the equipment then comes onto the premises, and a security interest 
is subsequently perfected, the landlord should prevail. 
(c) Trial Court's Decision 
Following the oral presentations of counsel, trial judge 
Stirba stated that she had reviewed the pleadings and the cases, 
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particularly the Utah cases, and the prior and present statutes. 
She stated that the present statute is susceptible to both 
interpretations advanced by the respective legal counsel. She 
stated it was not abundantly clear what the Legislature intended, 
and that the Legislature did not specify that security interests 
had to be perfected prior to the equipment coming onto the 
property. She stated that she had considered the statute and the 
exceptions to the landlord priority. She noted that the exceptions 
for taxes, mechanic liens, and employee wages do not require that 
they be established prior to the collateral coming onto the leased 
premises. She also noted that the statute says the lessor's lien 
is preferred to all of the liens or claims except for . . . 
"perfected security interests." She stated the Legislature has not 
required that perfected security interests be perfected prior to 
the property being brought onto the leasehold, and that because the 
other lien exceptions do not have to be created prior to the 
landlord lien to prevail, that a perfected security interest need 
not be created prior to the landlord lien for it to prevail. She 
noted this is a case of first impression, and that sham may occur. 
Her legal conclusion was that the statutory language does not 
indicate that the Legislature intended the security interest to be 
perfected prior to the collateral coming onto the property to 
prevail. Therefore, the trial court granted WestOne Bank's motion 
21 
for summary judgment. 
Citizens Bank Case 
Unfortunately, the case Citizens Bank v. Elks Building, N.V. , 
663 P.2d 56 (Utah 1983), was not brought to the attention of the 
court prior to her ruling. In the Citizens case, Justice Stewart, 
writing for a unanimous court, noted that the appeal therein 
concerned the* priority of claims to a security interest in personal 
property used in a restaurant that went out of business. The 
landlord (Elks Building), appellant, claimed a lien for unpaid 
rents pursuant to U.C.A., 1990, § 38-3-1, and a provision in the 
lease. The landlord contended its lien to be superior to Citizens 
Bank's lien which was perfected under the provisions of the UCC to 
secure a loan from the bank. The matter was adjudicated on cross-
motions for summary judgment. The trial court held for the bank, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
The stipulated facts were that the Elks Building owned a 
commercial building in Salt Lake City. On August 6, 1980, lessee 
leased space from the Elks Building in which to operate a 
restaurant. The lease ran from August 15, 1980 to February 14, 
1981. The lessee moved equipment necessary for the restaurant onto 
the lease premises, and in November, 1980, the lessee failed to 
make its monthly payment. On December 8, 1980, the landlord served 
notice of default, giving the lessee 30 days to pay the rent or 
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face legal action. The lessee did not respond and the lessee 
closed the restaurant December 15, 1980, leaving the equipment on 
the premises. The landlord padlocked the premises and took 
possession of the equipment. In March, 1981, the lessee applied 
for a $70,000 loan from Citizens Bank, which was approved and 
disbursed April 7, 1981. Citizens Bank took a security interest in 
the collateral which included all the equipment and fixtures the 
lessee owned, and included in the list was the restaurant equipment 
which the lessee had left on the landlord's premises. Citizens 
Bank perfected the security interest by filing a financing 
statement April 7, 1981. On April 9, 1981, the landlord filed its 
complaint against the lessee for unpaid lease payment and asserted 
the landlord's lien against the equipment. 
The landlord obtained a default judgment, foreclosing the 
lessee's interest in the restaurant equipment. A sheriff's sale 
was begun, and the bank presented its security interest claiming a 
priority over the landlord judgment lien. The sheriff terminated 
the sale because of the conflicting claims, and the lawsuit between 
the Elks Building and Citizens Bank ensued. 
The trial court ruled that the bank's security interest had 
priority over the landlord lien, and the landlord appealed. The 
landlord contended that it had a statutory lien and a common law 
contractual lien, and that both were prior to the bank's security 
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interest. In the Citizens case, the bank contended that the 
landlord liens were not valid, and even if they were valid, that 
the bank's security interest would be superior. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the issues as to the validity of the landlord 
liens are dispositive. 
Justice Stewart stated that § 38-3-1 creates a limited 
lessor's lien which provides that lessor shall have a lien for rent 
due upon all non-exempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon 
the leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy said 
premises and for 30 days thereafter. This lien terminates 30 days 
after the lessee quits the premises. The lessor's lien expired 
January 16, 1981, and barring a contractual lien, the lessor became 
an unsecured creditor of the lessee after January 16, 1981, citing 
Eason v. Wheelock, 101 Utah 162, 120 P.2d 319 (1941) and In re 
Stone's Estcite, 14 Utah 205, 46 P. 1101 (1896). 
Justice Stewart stated, 
In these types of cases, lessors, to preserve 
their statutory liens, must comply with the terms 
established by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-3-3 through 
38-3-6, including the 30-day period. These 
sections permit the lessor to file a complaint 
against the lessee, request a writ of attachment, 
and execute on the writ. Had Tthe lessor1 done this, 
its statutory lien would have been perfected, and 
it would have been prior to the Bank's security 
interest. (Emphasis added) 
Citizens, 663 P.2d at 58. 
The distinction between our case and the Elks Building case is 
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that in our case the lessor followed the statutory lien provisions, 
i.e. filed a complaint against the lessee, requested a writ of 
attachment, obtained a writ of attachment, and executed on the 
writ. All of this was done within 30 days of the lessee quitting 
the premises. By doing this, the lessor perfected its statutory 
lien and is prior to the bank's security interest. 
The court should follow the rule set forth in the Citizens 
case and direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lessor. 
POINT IV 
LESSOR'S LIEN IS SUPERIOR TO THE BANK'S LATER 
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST UNDER COMMON LAW 
FIRST TO ATTACH PRINCIPLES 
Utah statutory lessor's liens are provided for in Chapter 3, 
Sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-8 of U.C.A., 1990. When Chapter 3 is 
not applicable, common law principles apply.16 
Section 38-3-8 provides that "this chapter shall not be 
16
 Mr. Carney stated during his oral argument: "There are 
also cited in the other side's brief four cases from other 
jurisdictions. They do hold that the landlord's lien is superior 
to the perfected security interest. However, in each one of those 
cases, and in none of those cases, did the state involved have a 
statute like ours that says, 'perfected security interest shall be 
prior to the landlord's lien.' All of those cases, it was silent 
on the subject, and simply said that the landlord would have a 
lien. In which case, the court goes back to the common law, which 
is first to attach liens. And if we didn't have this statute, I 
would suspect that is what you would hear. The landlord would win, 
the first to attach." 
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applicable to a written lease for a term of years in which, as part 
of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a 
building or improvements upon the leased premises." This is 
exactly our fact situation. The lease was entered into July 2, 
1988, and the term was for a period of five years and two months, 
beginning the* first day of July 1988, and ending the 31st day of 
August, 1993. Lease Article XVIII provides for, "additional 
conditions."17 The subject lease is for a term of years with part 
of the consideration consisting of the lessee erecting improvements 
upon the leased premises; therefore, Chapter 3 is not applicable to 
this lease. Under the common law, the lessee's lien attaches to 
the property first and the landlord's lien has priority over the 
subsequent lien of the bank. 
17
 Lessor and lessee agree that lessee shall accept the 
building 'as is' condition and further agree as follows: (1) 
Lessor shall furnish and install concrete floor to match existing 
in front of area of warehouse, approximately 30' x 110'; (2) lessor 
shall furnish and install commercial grade carpet and base in 
existing office area; (3) lessor and lessee each agree to pay one-
half the cost to enlarge one existing rollup door to 14' x 14'. 
Final appearance shall match existing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lessor's lien is superior to the bank's later perfected 
security interest and lessor, therefore, respectfully requests this 
court to direct the trial court to enter judgment accordingly. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1991. 
By 
Robert F. 0rt6i 
Milo S. Mats€ten, Jr. 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
WILLIAM F. WEBB. Trustee of 
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LTD., a Limited Partnership 
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Transcript of: 
MOTIONS 
Case No. 900900672 
The above-entitled cause of action came on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, a Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, 
at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, June 10, 1991. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
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MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON fit 
GOTTFREDSON 
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FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG 
& HANSON 
175 So. West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MONDAY, JUNE 10, 1991 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the matter 
of William F. Webb against Ninow# case No. 900900672. Appearing 
on behalf of the plaintiff is Mr. Robert Orton. Appearing on 
behalf of defendant West One Bank is Francis Carney. 
The matter comes before the Court on West One Bank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. I reviewed the pleadings in the case 
and I appreciate Mr. Carney's book here just summarizing the 
pleadings and setting forth all of the courtesy copies of the 
pleadings which are at issue, and I have reviewed those. 
Mr. Carney, you may proceed. 
MR. CARNEY: Thank you. Your Honor. Let me briefly 
highlight the facts and if I am telling you facts you already 
know, please interrupt me. 
THE COURT: I guess the facts are not in dispute. 
You folks are in agreement as to when these things all occurred. 
It is just as I see it: the legal question of whether that is 
a timing element in this. 
MR. CARNEY: Yeah, and in that regard the timing 
element is that the lease is July 2nd of '88 and I think the 
cases do hold that the landlord's lien attaches as of the start 
of the tenancy. That would be July 2nd of '88. 
And then we have the first in a series of perfected 
1 
1 security interest, all of which now are the bank loans starting 
2 August 4, 1988. And we have the equipment brought onto the 
3 premises sometime before the fourth of August, 1988. We have 
4
 a default in the lease. The landlord is owed about $95,000. 
5
 The bcink is in default on the bank loans, owed about $150,000. 
6
 The Court may not be aware of this, but the 
? J collateral has been taken off the premises by stipulation of 
everyone. We happened to find a buyer who took the collateral 8 
9
 and sold it and got the $150,000 for the collateral, and that 
10 is sitting now in a bank account gathering interest, by 
1 1
 stipulation of everyone. We have agreed that we would still 
12 treat the priority issues as if the equipment were still on the 
13 premises. 
1 4
 The Statute is 38-3-2, the landlord's lien statute. 
15 it says landlords have prior liens, have a lien which is prior 
16 to everybody except taxes, mechanic's liens, perfected security 
17 interest and employee's wage earnings. Our position simply is 
18 that this statute means what it says. We have a perfected 
19 security interest, therefore we are prior to the landlord's lien 
20 Now, as I understand Mr, Orton's position is that 
21 the statute doesn't mean all perfected interest. It means only 
22 perfected security interest which were perfected prior to the 
23 time the equipment came on or the collateral came onto the 
24 property. In other words, if you had lease, first event; 
25 second event, collateral comes onto the property. Third event. 
bank takes a lien, perfected security interest rather, that type 
of security interest would not be prior since it arose after 
the date the collateral was on the premises. That is the issue: 
"Is that so was not so?" 
I find no guidance one way or the other in the cases. 
There is an old 1936 case referred to by Mr. Orton called 
Grey vs. Cappos, involving some sheep. The court held that the 
purchase money security interest was prior to the landlord's 
lien. But I don't think the facts are quite similar to this 
case, and the court doesn't really give us any guidance. 
There are also cited in the other side's brief four 
cases from other jurisdictions. The do hold that the landlord's 
lien is superior to the perfected security interest. However, 
in each one of those cases, and in none of those cases, did 
the state involved have a statute like ours that says "perfected 
security interest shall be prior to the landlord's lien." 
All of those cases, it was silent on the subject and simply said 
that the landlord would have a lien. In which case, the court 
goes back to the common law which is first to attach liens. And 
if we didn't have this statute, I would suspect that is what you 
would to hear. The landlord would win, the first to attach. 
If we were to interpret the statute to mean not 
perfected security interest, but prior perfected security 
interest, I suspect there would be no reason to have this statute 
iThat would bring us back to where we were under the common law; 
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first to attach liens. I suggest that this is a change, perhaps 
for a good policy reason. A change from the common law to allow 
all perfected security interest to be superior to landlords' 
liens. Perhaps the reason was that to allow people who lease 
premises to go out and borrow money and allow the banks to 
take security interest and equipment which is on the premises 
without worrying about the landlord. 
The other side says "Well, in this case, the landlord 
could be defrauded by sham security interest." I guess that is 
so, but I guess there is a way to look beyond sham security 
interest. I also suppose that the landlord could take his own 
UCC-1 to cover future rents ahead. I hadn"t really thought 
that through, but it seems to me that if the landlord was that 
concerned about the equipment, he could do that and then you wou 
simply have a contest under UCC-9: first to file will win. 
Basically, though, what I am arguing, if the 
legislature wanted to say "Prior perfected security interest 
only," it would have said so, and it didn't. It says "perfected 
security interest." We think the statute should be interpreted 
according to what it says. 
THE COURT: Are you aware of any other cases, or any 
case dealing with any of the other provisions in Section 38-3-2 
that contrue it one way or the other, whether they have to be 
established prior to the equipment being brought up to the 
property or — 
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MR. CARNEY: I have found nothing. 
THE COURT: Or similar arrangement? 
MR. CARNEY: I have found absolutely nothing on this. 
It says "perfected security interest." I think that was a 
1977 amendment. Before that, I think it said "purchase money 
security interest." It goes back to 1898 and there is only 
that "36 case and there is a '41 case which I think is also 
referenced. 
THE COURT: The Eastman case? 
MR. CARNEY: Yes, and I don't think that gives us 
much guidance either way. 
One other thing, I think if we adopted Mr. Orton's 
position to be logical it would seem to me that would also have 
to apply to tax liens and to employee wage claims, and to 
mechanics' liens. So, for example, for tax liens they would 
not have any priority unless they arose prior to the time the 
lienable collateral was brought onto the premises. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Orton. 
MR. ORTON: It appears we are in total agreement on 
the facts. Your Honor, and what the issue is. I believe that 
really the statute codifies what the common law is and I would 
like to spend just a little bit of time talking about the Grey 
vs. Cappos case. The statute which was in effect at the time 
of that case was 52-3-2, revised statutes of 1933. And that 
statute provided "that the lien provided for in this chapter 
5 
shall be preferred to all other liens or claims, except claims 
for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
mortgages for purchase money, and claims of employees for wages 
which are preferred by law." 
The current statute which was in effect at the time 
this cause of action arose only makes one difference, and that 
difference is instead of saying "mortgages for purchase money," 
it says "perfected security interest." So really I don't see 
a lot of change in the two statutes. We are dealing now under 
the UCC where security interests are required to be perfected 
generally by UCC-1 filing. So with that in mind, I think that 
although the Grey vs. Cappos case doesn't come right down and 
say it in so many words, it is helpful and let me just review 
the facts of that case if I might briefly. 
In October of 1982 the bank loaned Cappos $2,000 to 
purchase sheep and Cappos gave the bank a note and a mortgage to 
security payment of the purchase price. Subsequently, in 
January of 1929, the grazing lease was entered into. And then 
for several years thereafter, sheep were grazed on the landlord's 
property during the summer months of each year. After that 
grazing lease was entered into, there was a default or non-paymen|t 
of the note and mortgage, and the note and mortgage were renewed. 
And then on at least two subsequent occasions, there was additional 
money advanced and the note and mortgage were renewed. There was| 
|never a release given of the first mortgage and the Court found 
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that the intension of the mortgagor and mortgagee was that the 
new transactions constituted a renewal, not a new transaction. 
And that is the way the case went off, as I see it. The sheep 
were then sold in 1932, while on the premises of the landlord, 
and the landlord brings suit to collect rentals due and owing 
and seeks to have the sheep sold and collect the rent from the 
sale of the sheep. 
Now, as I understand what the court is saying in that 
case is, No. 1, the parties intended each new transaction or 
each new note and mortgage as a renewal of the first note and 
mortgage. And the earlier ones were not satisfied but there was 
simply a renewal. The court says that legal effect should be 
given to the intent of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 
Further, the plaintiff does not claim that his lien 
has priority over the first lien that was given, which came 
before the lease and before the sheep were ever put on the 
premises. And, however, on the later advances of money, he 
does claim that his lessor's lien is superior. The court says 
that the mortgage, though unrecorded, is valid as between the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee and those with notice of the 
mortgage. 
And finally, the court says that the plaintiff acquired 
no rights which Cappos, the owner of the sheep, did not have. 
The lien attached to whatever rights Cappos did have. And since 
that right is subject to the purchase money mortgage, it must 
7 
follow that the lien of the plaintiff is also subject to it. 
I think that language is very helpful. 
Our case is different. What we have here is, we 
have a lease on July 1, 1988, followed by equipment coming onto 
the premises. And then subsequent to the lease and the equipment 
coming onto the premises, there is a perfected security interest. 
And that is where the difference comes in between our case and 
the Cappos case; and that is that in our case the lease is 
entered into and the equipment comes onto the premises before 
any security interest. And as I view what the court is saying, 
the reason the court is holding against the plaintiff lessor in 
this case is because it contrues the subsequent notes and 
mortgages as renewals of the earlier mortgage which did come 
before the lease and before the sheep were put on the premises. 
Now, I really think that if that were not the 
construction that the legislature intended to be given, that 
certainly the lessor could be deprived of his lien rights though 
a sham transaction. A lessee presumably within a day or week 
before the termination of the lease, seeing the lease coming 
to an end and realizing he owes money on the lease, could borrow 
money, give security against the property on the premises and 
claim under the statute that the perfected security interest 
given is superior to the lien of the lessor. 
THE COURT: Let's suppose the legislature did intend 
that the statute not require perfection prior to the equipment. 
8 
1 property coming onto the leasehold. Assume that for a moment. 
2 And someone did try to defraud someone by perfecting a security 
3 interest in order to avoid the responsibilities of paying the 
4 leasehold and having a lien attached, would you see no remedy 
5 whatsoever in the Uniform Commercial Code for that kind of 
6 conduct? 
7 MR. ORTON: There might be a remedy based on fraud 
8 or something of that nature, yes. Yes. I really find no law, 
9 Your Honor, which would support the defendant's position in 
10 this case. And the law, we cited in our brief, I think, is 
11 consistent with our position. Although the facts are somewhat 
12 different and the statutes are somewhat different, I think if 
13 you take everything we have cited and what I understand the 
14 general law to be across the country, and then look at the one 
15 Utah case we do have, and view the basis on which the Supreme 
16 Court came down the way it did on this case, I think the logical 
17 conclusion is that the lessor's lien in this case where the 
18 lease was entered into first, the equipment came onto the 
19 premises second, and then the security interest came after, 
20 that the lessor's lien has priority. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
22 MR. ORTON: Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Carney. 
24 MR. CARNEY: A small point. Your Honor. 9 — I can't 
25 remember what it is -- 9104 says that in order to create a 
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security interest, you must give value and if no true value is 
given, then there is no security interest and a sham could be 
taken apart like that. I will submit it, unless there are 
questions I haven't answered. 
THE COURT: No, thank you. I have reviewed the 
pleadings as I indicated previously, and the cases that you have 
cited, particularly the Utah cases. Mr. Orton, I think — and 
I have looked at this statute and predecessor statute as well. 
And I think that the statute may be suspectible to both 
interpretations. I don't think that this is abundantly clear 
what the legislature intended with regard to that. At least, 
it don't specifically address whether the security interest had 
to be perfected prior to the property equipment being brought 
onto the premises. I have considered the statute and the other 
interests that are accepted under it; specifically, the claims 
for taxes and liens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this title, 
and claims of employees for wages which are preferred by law, 
none of which, I believe, are required to be perfected prior 
to the leasehold creations, if you will, and the interest coming 
onto the property, if you will, under the leasehold. And the 
statute does say "that the lien provided for in this chapter 
shall be preferred to all of the liens or claims except for, 
among the other things, perfected security interest." 
After considering all of it and your arguments, as 
well, I am persuaded that the legislature has not required that 
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the claimed security interest be perfected prior to the property 
being brought onto the leasehold. And I think that because — 
I don't see that the other interest there have to be perfected 
either. And the legislature hasn't seen fit to distinguish 
perfected security interest from other interest that it accepted 
under that particular statute. 
This does seem to be a case of first impression, 
at least so far as the perfected security interest language is 
concerned. And because it is my view that — concern about 
sham security interest may occur, I think there is some 
safeguard for that. Accordingly, I think that the language of 
the statute, although not as clear as every one would like it 
to be, the plain reading of the statute does not indicate that 
the legislature intended security interest to be perfected 
prior to the property being secured from coming onto the 
leasehold, and that would be my ruling, Mr. Carney, Mr. Orton. 
Therefore, I am granting West One Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. I am denying the plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Carney, I would like you to prepare Findings of 
fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's ruling. 
MR. CARNEY: Thank you. Your Honor. 
* * * * * * * 
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ADDENDUM 
Schedule "A" 
Critical Events (time line • > : 
Lessor (1) Lease inception; 
(2) Collateral onto premises; 
(3) Lessee's failure to pay rent; 
(4) Lessee's ending occupancy of premises; 
(5) Within 30 days, filing complaint, 
affidavit, and bond for writ of 
attachment on collateral. 
Competing 
Security 
Interest - (1) Perfection of competing security 
interest. 
Kappos (1) Perfection of competing security interest 
(purchase money chattel mortgage on sheep 
with lessor having actual notice); 
(2) Lease inception; 
(3) Collateral onto premises (sheep); 
(4) Additional advance of monies and renewal 
of note and chattle mortgage; 
(5) Lessee's failure to pay rent; 
(6) Lessee ending occupancy (selling sheep); 
(7) Complaint. 
Result: lessor loses. 
Citizens (1) Lease inception; 
(2) Collateral onto premises (restaurant 
equipment); 
(3) Lessee's failure to pay rent; 
(4) Lessee's ending occupancy of premises; 
(5) After 30 days, filing complaint, 
affidavit, and bond for writ of attach-
ment on collateral; 
(6) Perfection of competing security inter-
est. 
Result: lessor loses. 
BUT on event (5), court says that had lessor 
within 30 days filed complaint, affidavit, bond for writ of 
attachment on collateral, result would be different. 
Result: lessor wins. 
Webb > (1) Lease inception; 
(2) Collateral onto premises (laminating 
equipment); 
(3) Perfection of competing security 
interest; 
(4) Lessee's failure to pay rent; 
(5) Lessee's ending occupancy of premises; 
(6) Within 30 days, filing complaint, 
affidavit, and bond for writ of attach-
ment on collateral. 
Result: lessor should win. 
Discussion 
The rule of Citizens is that not every perfected security 
interest competing with a lessor's lien prevails. Citizens dicta 
provides that a competing perfected security interest created 
after the lessor's lien attaches and where the lessor's lien 
(within 30 days of lessee's occupancy ending) is preserved by 
lessor filing a complaint, affidavit and bond for writ of 
attachment, results in the lessor winning. 
The Webb case presents a slightly different fact situation. 
What happens when (1) lessor's lien attaches; (2) the competing 
security interest is perfected; and (3) the lessor timely files 
its complaint, affidavit, bond and obtains a writ of attachment 
on the collateral before the competing perfected security 
interest takes any steps to foreclose its perfected security 
interest? The lessor should prevail. 
